Abstract: This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the 1960s conglomerates were inefficient. I offer valuation results consistent with recent event-study evidence that markets typically rewarded diversifying acquisitions. Using new data, I compute industry-adjusted valuation, profitability, leverage, and investment ratios for thirty-six large, acquisitive conglomerates from 1966 to 1974. During the early 1970s, the conglomerates were less valuable and less profitable than standalone firms, favoring an agency explanation for unrelated diversification. In the 1960s, however, conglomerates were not valued at a discount. Evidence from acquisition histories suggests that conglomerate diversification may have added value by creating internal capital markets.
Introduction
Corporate restructuring in the 1980s has generally been seen as an "undoing" of the earlier, conglomerate merger wave of the 1960s and early 1970s. In the consensus view, the last thirty years have been a "round trip of the American corporation" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1991) , a trip from specialization to conglomeration and back to specialization or "focus." This view is based partly on evidence from studies of the conglomerate period by Rumelt (1974 Rumelt ( , 1982 , Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) , Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) , and others who find no evidence that conglomerate diversification improved long-term firm performance. Combined with findings of negative market valuations for diversified firms and diversifying acquisitions during the 1980s (Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarrell, 1995) , the evidence has led to the conclusion that unrelated diversification is per se inefficient, and that the conglomerate era is best understood as an agency phenomenon.
Recent findings question this conventional wisdom, however. Matsusaka (1993a) and Hubbard and Palia (1999) provide event-study evidence that diversifying acquisitions were value-increasing during the conglomerate period. In light of the newer evidence, " [t] he simple view that the 1980s 'bust-ups' were a corrective to past managerial excesses is untenable" (Matsusaka, 1993a) . Moreover, major U.S. corporations continue to be diversified. Montgomery (1994) reports that for each of the years 1985, 1989, and 1992 , over two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies were active in at least five distinct lines of business (defined by 4-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes). As she reminds us, "While the popular press and some researchers have highlighted recent divestiture activity among [the largest U.S.] firms, claiming a 'return 1 Several recent studies also question the claim that diversification destroyed value in the 1980s and 1990s. Maksimovic and Phillips (forthcoming) argue that comparative advantage, rather than agency costs or financialmarket imperfections, explains why diversified firms appear to trade at a discount. Chevalier (1999) , Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (forthcoming) , and Campa and Kedia (2000) show that selection effects, rather than value destruction, explain much of the observed discount. But see Matsusaka (1996) for the case that antitrust enforcement did not play a major role in the diversification of the 1960s. In a sample of 549 acquisitions from 1968, he found that diversification was equally likely when small firms merged as when large firms merged, even though only large firms would have been subject to antitrust scrutiny. 2 to the core,' some changes at the margin must not obscure the fact that these firms remain remarkably diversified." 1 Another problem with the agency view of the 1960s is that it is based largely on ex post evidence. Studies such as Ravenscraft and Scherer's (1987) look at the long-term, post-merger performance of merging firms, or the value added from the breakups of the 1980s (and by implication, of the value lost from the conglomerations of the 1960s). This evidence does not control, however, for the competitive, regulatory, and institutional changes of the last 30 or 40 years, changes that likely affect the relative efficiency of diversification. Capital markets have become more competitive, specialized management and personnel consultants have replaced some internal management and control systems, and antitrust authorities have taken a more relaxed attitude toward horizontal and vertical (as opposed to conglomerate) expansion.
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If these changes are exogenous, then the relative value of conglomerate firms will have changed over time-whatever the efficiency properties of diversification in general.
Can the placing of various diverse business units within a single ownership structure create value? One theory is that the subunits can benefit from the creation of an internal capital market within the conglomerate. Alchian (1969) , Williamson (1975) , Gertner, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) , and Stein (1997) argue that internal capital markets have advantages where access to external funds is limited. The central office of the diversified firm can use informational advantages, residual control rights, and its ability to intervene selectively in divisional affairs to 3 This literature includes Matsusaka (1993a Matsusaka ( , 1993b ; Barber, Palmer, and Wallace (1995) ; Servaes (1996) ; and Hubbard and Palia (1999) . 3 allocate resources within the firm better than the external capital markets would do if the divisions were standalone firms. However, rent seeking by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000) , bargaining problems within the firm (Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000) or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998) can make divisional cross-subsidization inefficient.
The present paper contributes to a growing empirical literature that examines the costs and benefits of diversification by reevaluating the evidence from the conglomerate period itself. However, unlike most other studies, which look at broad samples of diversified and nondiversified firms, I focus on a narrowly defined sample of large, highly diversified conglomerates, the firms in which internal-capital-market advantages are most likely to be realized. My sample-a panel of thirty-six "acquisitive" conglomerates from 1966 to 1974, the height of the conglomerate merger wave-contains more detailed business-segment information than that available to previous researchers. Using these line-of-business data, for each firm in each year of the sample I construct a benchmark portfolio of assets, distributed across lines of business in the same proportions as the conglomerate. This matched portfolio is composed of shares of nondiversified firms whose main industries match those of each conglomerate division (and are similar in size). The shares are weighted to correspond to the conglomerate's distribution of activity in each line of business. By subtracting from each conglomerate's value or profit a weighted average of the values or profits of its matching standalone firms, I measure the value added by firm-level diversification, controlling for industry and scale effects.
My results challenge the idea that conglomeration is per se inefficient. Specifically. I find an average "diversification discount" of 0.07 and a median discount of 0.08 for the 1966-74 period, much smaller than the discounts reported by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) for the 1980s. Moreover, the discount changes substantially over time. For the middle years of the sample, 1969 to 1971, I find an average discount of 0.18 and a median discount of 0.11. For the latest years, 1972 to 1974, the average discount is slightly higher, 0.20, while the median discount falls to 0.04. During the earliest years of the sample, 1966 to 1968, I find an average diversification "premium" of 0.27, and a median discount of 0.08, though neither the premium nor the discount is statistically significantly different from zero. In other words, while large, acquisitive conglomerates tended to perform more poorly than their matched portfolio benchmarks during the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, many conglomerates performed very well during the middle and late 1960s, and conglomerates as a group were not valued at a discount. When I control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics and other known determinants of firm value such as operating efficiency and leverage, the average 1966-68 premium rises to 0.36 (and becomes statistically significant), the average 1969-71 discount falls to 0.01 (no longer statistically significant), and the average 1972-74 discount falls to 0.17 (still statistically significant). This suggests that conglomeration may have added value during the late 1960s, but reduced value during the early 1970s.
What could explain such a valuation premium? Further analysis suggests that the valuation and profitability results reflect the changing efficiency of internal capital markets. Following Hubbard and Palia (1999) , I construct measures of external financing constraints for my sample conglomerates and their acquisition targets. Hubbard and Palia find that the highest abnormal bidder returns in diversifying acquisitions during the 1960s came when financially unconstrained firms acquired firms that faced costly external financing (or vice versa). This implies that market participants expected diversifying acquisitions to create value by providing opportunities by creating internal capital markets. Using a similar approach, I show that those of my sample conglomerates that made internal-capital-market generating acquisitions were rewarded with higher industry-adjusted q and profitability ratios than those conglomerates that made other kinds 4 Matsusaka (forthcoming) also uses the Weston-Mansinghka list. Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) , Lichtenberg (1992) , and Liebeskind and Opler (1995) use the census data. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) use the FTC data, while Servaes (1996) and Matsusaka (forthcoming) get segment information from the Million Dollar Directory. 5 of acquisitions. Moreover, the valuation premium for firms with internal capital markets is highest during the 1966-68 period, when the average conglomerate was not valued at a discount.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample, data, and methods. Basic results are presented in section 3. Section 4 explains the analysis of internalcapital-market advantages based on acquisitions and external financing constraints. Section 5 concludes.
Data and methods
To construct the dataset I begin with the 63 firms used in Weston and Mansinghka's (1971) pioneering study of conglomerates. 4 This list consists of all firms making at least three mergers during the 1960-68 period and meeting the following conditions: (1) at least 20% of the increase in the firm's total assets during the period must be from external acquisitions, and (2) in 1968 the firm must be active in at least ten 3-digit SIC categories or at least five 2-digit SIC categories.
For each firm on the Weston-Mansinghka list, I hand-collected business-segment information from annual reports, SEC form 10-Ks, and standard reference sources such as Moody's Industrial Manual.
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These sources provide descriptions of the firms' product lines and some measure of activity by industry segment, most often segment sales. Assets, income, or capital expenditures by industry segment were almost never reported. (Indeed, firms were generally reluctant to 6 Some segments changed their reported activities from year to year, in which case I adjusted the segment SIC codes accordingly. 6 release any line-of-business information until it became required on the form 10-K.) Based on product descriptions I assigned a 4-digit SIC code to each segment in each year. 6 Using these sources, I could find reliable segment information for 36 of the Weston-Mansinghka firms. This left a sample of 36 conglomerates with sales-weighted segment information, a richer dataset than that those used for previous studies of this period. A list of these firms is provided in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 about here] Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the sample. Panel A gives average and median sales, assets, and earnings (EBIT) for the sample conglomerates and for all manufacturing firms (defined as all firms in the NBER Master File; see Hall, 1990 , for a description).
Clearly, these conglomerates were large firms-much larger, on average, than the typical firm. Table 2 gives information on the conglomerates' levels of diversification, first by the number of industry segments per observation, and second by segment sales-weighted Herfindahl indexes (as in Comment and Jarrell, 1995, and Stulz, 1994) . The average number of segments per firm-year is 5.1, with a minimum of two and a maximum of ten. The Herfindahls are calculated, for each firm-year, as the sum of squared segment sales divided by total sales. A four-segment firm with one large segment and three small segments has a larger 7
The adjustment for age structure is as described in Hall, 1990. 7 Herfindahl than a firm with four equally sized segments; hence the segment Herfindahl provides a more precise measure of diversification than simply reporting the number of segments. The Herfindahls vary from a minimum of 0.11 to a maximum of 0.70, indicating considerable variety in these firms' diversification strategies. Admittedly, these industry segments are coarser than true lines of business; nonetheless they provide reasonable approximations of actual business activities.
[ Table 2 about here] These figures highlight a key difference between my sample firms and those that make up Servaes's (1996) From the NBER Master File I then retrieved data for Tobin's q, operating profit, cash flow, leverage, and investment for each conglomerate. Tobin's q is computed as the market value of common and preferred stock plus the book value of short-and long-term debt, adjusted for age structure, less the net short-term assets, all divided by the book value of capital stock.
7
Because firms with low q ratios have low expected cash flows relative to the amount of invested capital, q can be interpreted as a measure of the firm's investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993) , or as a measure of managerial inefficiency or agency conflict within the firm (Lang, Stulz, and Walkling, 1991) . Operating profit (operating income divided by total assets) is used to measure the efficiency of the firm's operating units, independent of the firm's capital structure, investment policy, and other variables that are part of the firm's corporate-level strategy. Cash flow is measured as income available for common plus depreciation less income taxes paid, all divided by net sales. Leverage is defined as the value of long-term debt, adjusted for age structure, divided by total assets, and investment is defined as gross investment divided by total assets. Table 3 reports unadjusted value and performance measures for the full, nine-year panel and three 3-year subperiods. As seen in the table, the average value of large, acquisitive conglomerates was declining throughout the sample period. The sample firms have an average q of 2.03 during the 1966-68 subperiod (the peak of the conglomerate "boom"), 1.24 during the 1969-71 subperiod, and 0.94 during the 1972-74 subperiod. Median q declines similarly from 1.50 to 1.12 to 0.90. Operating profit and cash flow remained roughly constant, while leverage increased slightly and investment declined.
[ Table 3 about here] Are these patterns caused by diversification? One way to assess the effect of diversification on value would be to compare conglomerates to specialized firms. However, if the divisions of a conglomerate are systematically located in high-q industries, or systematically operate at a more efficient scale, then this comparison would suggest that diversification adds value although the positive relation between diversification and value has nothing to do with diversification itself.
To address this problem, I compare the characteristics of the sample conglomerates with the characteristics they would have if each division were like the median standalone firm in the same 8 I excluded financial segments (SIC 6000-6999) and segments for regulated utilities (SIC 4900 and SIC 4999).
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The standard deviation was 4.3 matching firms per segment-year, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 21. The NBER Master File excludes many non-manufacturing firms, so the segments that failed to match were typically non-manufacturing segments or very small segments. given year conglomerate i has total sales X i , segments j = 1, ... , n, and segment sales x i j . For a particular financial ratio R, conglomerate i's industry-adjusted R for that year is given by
where R i is the conglomerate's own R, r i j is the median R of segment j's matching firms, and w i j = x i j « X i is the weight assigned to division j. Industry-adjusted q, for example, can be interpreted as the difference between the conglomerate's own q and the q it would have most likely had if each of its divisions were as valuable as the median standalone firm in the same industry and about the same size. Weston and Mansinghka (1971) and Melicher and Rush (1973) also found that conglomerates were highly leveraged. Weston (1981) suggests that conglomerate acquirers specifically sought targets whose debt capacity had not been fully utilized.
Results

Basic results
11
The statistical significance of the industry-adjusted values reported in Table 4 is potentially overstated because the same firm is included several times in each subperiod. I correct for this in the regression models reported below, and the significance levels are the same.
have negative industry-adjusted q ratios and operating profit margins, and positive industryadjusted leverage ratios. The industry-adjusted q ratios correspond to an average diversification discount of 0.07 and a median discount of 0.08. During this period the conglomerates were less valuable, less profitable, and more highly leveraged than size-weighted groups of nondiversified firms from the same industries.
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(Industry-adjusted cash flow and investment values are essentially zero). Consistent with Servaes (1996) , there is a negative relationship between diversification and value, though the discount is small.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results vary widely among the three subperiods. Average industry-adjusted q is 0.27 for the first subperiod (not significantly different from zero), !0.18 for the second (significant at the 5% level), and !0.20 for the third (significant at the 1% level). In other words, there is a diversification premium from 1966 to 1968 and a moderate discount from 1969 to 1971 and from 1972 to 1974. Median industry-adjusted q is !0.08 for the first subperiod (not significantly different from zero), !0.11 for the second (significant at the 1% level), and !0.04 for the third (significant at the 1% level). The divergence between average and median industry-adjusted q for the 1966-68 subperiod implies that the distribution of q during this subperiod is highly skewed; conglomerate performance was more volatile during this period than during the other periods.
Industry-adjusted operating profit, cash flow, leverage, and investment do not change substantially across subperiods. In short, despite low current profitability and high leverage, adjusted for industry, investors did not discount conglomerate stocks as a group prior to 1969.
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Do these results reflect the value of diversification per se, or only large, acquisitive conglomerates? Servaes (1996) studies single-and multiple-segment firms from the same period and finds a different result: multiple-segment firms were valued at a substantial discount compared to single-segment firms during the 1960s, but not during the early 1970s. This suggests that my result holds only for large, acquisitive conglomerates and not for diversified firms more generally.
To see how my sample of acquisitive conglomerates compares to Servaes's sample I computed industry-adjusted q ratios for my sample firms using the same procedure Servaes used to compute his Table III. Servaes's sample includes less detailed segment information, so he could not control for scale in constructing industry-adjusted q ratios, nor construct activityweighted averages. Imitating his procedure, I adjusted the q ratios for my sample firms by two methods, first using the firm's primary industry only, and second using an equally weighted average of all the firm's industries. I also did not control for scale in selecting the matching firms. Table 5 . That is, my large, acquisitive conglomerates were valued much more highly than the average diversified firm during the early period, about the same during the middle period, and less highly during the later period. Looking at the medians rather than the means, the results are similar: my conglomerates were valued much more highly (that is, discounted much less severely) than the average diversified firm during the early period, somewhat more highly during Innovation rents, the returns from being the first to develop a new product, process, or organizational form, are featured prominently in recent models of endogenous innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990) .
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The subperiod difference tests are analogous to the "differences-in-differences" tests used in the literature on natural experiments (Meyer, 1995, and Heckman and Smith, 1995) . 13 the middle period, and about the same during the later period. Over this period the performance of large, acquisitive conglomerates was much more volatile than the performance of diversified firms more generally.
[ Table 5 about here]
One possible explanation for these results is that the firms in my sample were the first to develop the conglomerate form during the early and middle 1960s and were earning "innovation rents" as late as the 1966-68 period.
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As the innovation was diffused, those rents were dissipated, disappearing by the late 1960s and early 1970s. Moreover, Table 5 demonstrates that industry-adjusted values can vary substantially depending on the weighting and sampling procedure. By using segment data without weights, Servaes (1996) could expand his sample to a broad set of diversified and nondiviersified firms, but at the cost of less precise estimates of industry-adjusted values. Specifically, comparison of Panels B and C of Table 5 suggests that Servaes's method of assigning equal segment weights can bias downward the estimates of industry-adjusted q, relative to the procedure of using correct segment weights. This may explain part of the difference in our results. Table 4 reports the change in industry-adjusted q between the subperiods.
Panel B of
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Between the first and second subperiods, average industry-adjusted q falls from 0.27 to !0.18, a difference of !0.45 (significant at the 5% level). Between the second and third subperiods, average industry-adjusted q falls from !0.18 to !0.20. This shows that the measured differences in industry-adjusted q between the first and second subperiods are not due to random error.
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, the diversification discount was imposed on large, acquisitive conglomerates only at the end of the 1960s.
Sample selection issues
One concern with the results reported above is that the panel is unbalanced, as data were unavailable for several firms in the sample during the earliest years. The entry of new firms in the sample could bias the results for the earlier, 1966-68 subperiod. For example, average industryadjusted q would appear to decline after 1969 if the sample contained only firms with aboveaverage ratios for the earliest years, while firms with below-average industry-adjusted q ratios were added over time.
To investigate this possibility I redid the comparisons for various subsets of firms in the sample. First, I created a balanced panel including only the firms that were present in 1966.
Qualitatively, the results (not reported here) are similar to those presented in Table 4 , with one exception: the conglomerates now have negative average industry-adjusted q ratios for the 1966-68 subperiod (significant at the 5% level). Second, I did the same comparisons, over the same three periods, including only the firms present in 1967. The qualitative results are now virtually identical to those presented in Table 4 (the 1966-68 discount becomes a premium, significant at the 10% level). This means that average conglomerate q rises, not falls, as firms enter the sample in 1967. The entry of additional firms in 1968 and 1969 does not affect the general result. In short, changes in the composition of the sample over time do not appear to be driving the findings. On the other hand, the fact that the sign of the average discount switches during the early period and is significant shows how difficult it is to estimate accurately the size of the diversification discount using these data.
Another potential problem is that Weston and Mansinghka's list of acquisitive conglomerates, from which my sample is drawn, is composed of firms that were both highly diversified and 
Regression-adjusted comparisons of firm value
Measures of firm value such as q depend on observable firm characteristics such as operating efficiency, leverage, and investment. Because the matching procedure for calculating industryadjusted q ratios does not match by these characteristics, it is possible that the signs and magnitudes of the industry-adjusted q ratios are driven by differences between the conglomerates and the matching firms in profitability, leverage, and investment rather than agency costs or access to internal capital markets. Indeed, as Table 4 reveals, the conglomerates and matching firms do differ in operating profit, leverage, and, investment.
To explore this possibility, I pooled the conglomerates and matched portfolios into a single panel and regressed q on operating profit, leverage, investment, and an indicator variable, "conglomerate dummy," that distinguishes between conglomerate and matched portfolio observations. This checks for differences in q while controlling for other known determinants of firm value. The regressions include a fixed effect for each conglomerate-portfolio pair to control for unobserved heterogeneity among the conglomerates and to explore the effects of within-pair changes in the degree and type of diversification over time. I also included year-fixed effects to control for changes in the economic environment over time. To control for the fact that the paired observations are not independent within each cross section, I compute robust standard errors (White, 1980) treating each conglomerate-portfolio pair, rather than each observation, as an independent unit.
The results, presented in Table 6 , largely confirm the results of Table 4 . In the first, third, fifth, and seventh columns, only the indicator variable and a constant are used as regressors; the coefficients on the indicator variable thus correspond exactly to the industry-adjusted q ratios reported in Table 4 . The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth columns add operating profit and leverage as additional regressors. Consistent with the literature, there is a positive relation between profitability and value. (Leverage has no systematic effect on q, however.) For the 1966-68 subperiod industry-adjusted q increases from 0.27 to 0.36 (and becomes statistically significant). For the 1969-71 subperiod it falls from !0.18 to -.12 (and becomes insignificant), and for the 1972-74 subperiod it falls from !0.20 to !0.17 (still significant). In other words, when differences in operating efficiency and leverage are taken into account, the average diversification premium is larger for the first subperiod and the average diversification discount smaller for the second two subperiods. Again, this is inconsistent with the claim that conglomeration always destroys value.
[ Table 6 about here] 14 Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) , Wulf (1999) , Chevalier (1999) , and Whited (forthcoming) also study the efficiency of internal capital markets using similar techniques. 
The value of internal capital markets: evidence from acquisitions
The evidence presented so far suggests that large conglomerates performed reasonably well before 1970, but poorly afterward. Can the results for the late 1960s be attributed to internalcapital-market advantages? Lamont (1997) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , and Scharfstein (1998) study the efficiency of internal capital markets by looking directly at the direction of cross-subsidization within the firm. Shin and Stulz (1998) , for example, show that diversified firms tend to misallocate investment resources, failing to direct funds to divisions in industries with high growth opportunities. The NBER Exit List names all firms that exited from the 1991 version of the NBER Manufacturing Sector Master File, together with the reason for their exit, and the name (and CUSIP, where available) of the acquirer or successor. 16 Hubbard and Palia (1999) use two indicators for access to external finance: the firm's dividend payout ratio and its investment rate. Unfortunately, only a few of my targets had useable data for the investment rate, so I use only the dividend payout ratio. ; the FTC Statistical Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, 1979 (Federal Trade Commission, 1981) ; the acquisition data from Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) ;
and an acquisition list provided by Mike Sullivan. From these sources I identified 215 acquisitions made by my 36 conglomerates from 1964 to 1974. Of the 215 targets, 158 had useable data for measuring access to external finance. Following Hubbard and Palia, I classify a target as financially constrained if its dividend payout ratio is lower than the median dividend payout ratio of all targets in the sample, and financially unconstrained otherwise. I use the same technique to classify the 36 conglomerate bidders in each year.
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I designate an acquisition as having created an internal capital market if during the previous year, the bidder is financially constrained and the target is unconstrained, or the bidder is financially unconstrained and the target is constrained. I was able to classify 131 acquisitions in this fashion. Of these, 54 created internal capital markets (or extended existing internal capital markets). I thus classify a conglomerate as having an internal capital market in a particular year if it participated in at least one internal-capital-marketgenerating acquisition prior to that year. Table 7 reports industry-adjusted values for q and operating profit for conglomerates with and without internal capital markets. As before, the results are segregated by time period. The first row shows the industry-adjusted q ratios for all firm-years in the sample (taken from Table 4 ). The second row shows industry-adjusted q ratios for only those firm-years following acquisitions creating internal capital markets. To distinguish the effects of these particular acquisitions from the effects of acquisitions per se, I also provide industry-adjusted q ratios for firm-years following other acquisitions. The fourth pair of rows shows the differences between the values reported in the second and third pairs of rows.
[ Table 7 about here]
The results are striking. During the 1966-68 subperiod, the average industry-adjusted q for conglomerates with at least one prior internal-capital-market-generating acquisition was 0.32, while the average industry-adjusted q for conglomerates without such acquisitions (but with other prior acquisitions) was !0.28, a difference of 0.60. (The difference in median q is also 0.60.) During the second subperiod, the average industry-adjusted q ratios are !0.14 and !0.30, respectively, a difference of 0.16 (the difference in median q is 0.12). During the third subperiod, the average industry-adjusted q ratios are !0.12 and !0.07, a difference of !0.05 (the difference in median q is !0.03). Thus during the first subperiod, industry-adjusted q was much higher for firms with internal capital markets than those without them. During the second subperiod, firms with internal capital markets were again valued more highly than those without, though the difference is smaller. During the third subperiod, firms with internal capital markets are not valued more highly than firms without them. Moreover, the differences between the first and second subperiods are driven almost entirely by changes in the value of internal capital markets, not the value of conglomerates per se. That is, industry-adjusted q varies much less between the subperiods for acquisitive firms that did not create internal capital markets than for firms that did 17 The conglomerates continued to make internal-capital-market generating acquisitions throughout the entire sample period, so these results are not driven by a change in the pattern of acquisitions away from those that generated internal capital markets. For example, 38% of conglomerate acquisitions prior to 1966 created internal capital markets; from 1966 to 1968 the figure is 52%; from 1969 to 1971 it is 39%; and from 1972 to 1974 it is 64%.
18 Malkiel (1990, p. 63) attributes conglomerate valuation premiums entirely to investor irrationality. Conglomerate managers, he says, "almost invented a new language in the process of dazzling the investment community. They talked about market matrices, core technology fulcrums, modular building blocks, and the nucleus theory of growth. No one from Wall Street really knew what the words meant, but they all got the nice, warm feeling of being in the technological mainstream." Conglomerate mergers, he says, were merely a "con game." 21 create them. Firms with internal capital markets were valued at a substantial premium before 1969, and valued at a small discount afterwards.
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One interpretation of these valuation results is that investors expected internal capital markets to be efficient during the 1960s, changed their minds at the end of the decade, then revised their expectations downwards. However, the results cannot be explained entirely by market expectations of future performance, because industry-adjusted operating profit-a measure of the efficiency of current operations-is also higher for conglomerates with internal capital markets.
As Table 7 shows, average industry-adjusted operating profit over the three subperiods was !0.006, !0.004, and !0.011, respectively, for firm-years following acquisitions creating internal capital markets, and !0.016, !0.014, and !0.016 for firm-years following other acquisitions. Of course, industry-adjusted operating profit was negative, even for the conglomerates with internal capital markets, which does not imply superior performance relative to the standalones. Still, these firms were more efficient (or less inefficient) than conglomerates without internal capital markets. This suggests that investors' expectations about the value of internal capital markets may have been based on real, underlying factors, not misguided beliefs.
18
A problem with these calculations is that they assume that once a firm has made a single internal-capital-market-generating acquisition, it retains the benefits of internal capital markets in perpetuity. The results are thus misleading if the effects of these acquisitions diminishes with time. As a robustness check, I performed the same exercise, this time focusing only on observations in the year immediately following an acquisition. The new calculations are reported in the last three pairs of rows of Table 7 . The results are roughly the same as before. In all three subperiods, firm-years immediately following acquisitions creating internal capital markets have higher industry-adjusted q ratios than firm-years immediately following other acquisitions, with the largest difference by far occurring in the 1966-68 subperiod. The results are similar, but weaker, for operating profit. In short, the basic results hold whether acquisitions creating internal capital markets are modeled as having a permanent effect the firm's capital budgeting policy or only a one-year effect. These may be thought of as upper and lower bounds, so the true effect is almost certainly similar.
Conclusions
The basic finding of this paper is that conglomerate performance, compared with appropriately defined benchmarks, was better than the conventional wisdom holds. While the conglomerates were poor performers after 1969, during the late 1960s they performed reasonably well. More specifically, some firms-what Williamson (1975) calls "appropriately organized conglomerates"-were able to add value by creating internal capital markets. The stock market rewarded firms creating internal capital markets in the 1960s, but not in the 1970s. This evidence presents problems for the view that conglomerate diversification is always inefficient and that the divestitures of the 1980s show the failures of the 1960s.
Why did the value of internal capital markets fall at the end of the 1960s? A common suggestion is that internal capital markets were always inefficient, but market participants only learned this over time, as information about poor operating performance was revealed. However, as seen in Table 7 , the relative profitability of internal capital markets was also highest during the 19 Similarly, corporate refocusing can be explained as a consequence of the rise of takeover by tender offer rather than proxy contest, the emergence of new financial techniques and instruments like leveraged buy-outs and highyield bonds, and the appearance of takeover and breakup specialists like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts which themselves performed many functions of the conglomerate HQ (Williamson, 1992) . A related literature looks at the relative importance of internal capital markets in developing economies, where external capital markets are limited Palepu 1999, 2000) . 23 late 1960s, the period of the valuation premium. Thus the change in conglomerate value over time cannot be entirely attributed to changes in expectations.
Another possibility is that internal capital markets became less important as the external capital market became more efficient. The investment community in the 1960s has been described as a small, close-knit group where competition was minimal and peer influence strong (Bernstein, 1992) . As Bhide (1990) puts it, "internal capital markets 0. 0. 0. may well have possessed a significant edge because the external markets were not highly developed. In those days, one's success on Wall Street reportedly depended far more on personal connections than analytical prowess." When capital markets became more competitive in the 1970s, the relative importance of internal capital markets fell. "This competitive process has resulted in a significant increase in the ability of our external capital markets to monitor corporate performance and allocate resources" (Bhide, 1990) . As the cost of external finance has fallen, firms have tended to rely less on internal finance, and thus the value added from internal-capital-market allocation has fallen.
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Another possibility is that the potential drawbacks of internal capital markets-divisional rent seeking, bargaining problems, and bureaucratic rigidity-came to outweigh the advantages, independent of the efficiency of external capital markets. Unfortunately, without data on internalresource-allocation patterns during this period it is difficult to assess this hypothesis. Table 4 does reveal that conglomerates were somewhat more highly leveraged (adjusted for industry) during the 1966-68 subperiod than the subsequent periods. If leverage reduces agency costs, as suggested by Jensen (1986) , then changes in capital structure could explain the changes in 24 internal organizational efficiency. A systematic examination of the conglomerates' leverage policies could provide insight here.
Ultimately, these issues are most likely to be settled by in-depth case studies of individual firms rather than econometric studies. As this paper shows, conclusions drawn from empirical studies of the conglomerate period are very sensitive to the quality of the underlying segment data, and the limits of hand collection preclude the use of large datasets. Hopefully complementary, qualitative evidence can be brought to bear on this phenomenon. Sample means and medians. Tobin's q is computed as the market value of common and preferred stock plus the book value of short-and long-term debt, less the net short-term assets, all divided by the book value of capital stock. Operating profit is defined as operating income divided by total assets. Cash flow is defined as income available for common plus depreciation less income taxes paid, all divided by net sales. Leverage is defined as the book value of long-term debt divided by total assets. Investment is defined as gross investment divided by total assets. Panel regressions of q on profitability, leverage, and a constant. The sample pools conglomerate and matched portfolio observations into a single panel and adds an indicator variable, "conglomerate dummy," to distinguish between them. (The coefficients on the indicator variable in the first, third, fifth, and seventh columns correspond to the industry-adjusted q ratios reported in Panel A of Table 4 .) The models include year-fixed effects and a fixed effect for each conglomerate-portfolio pair. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors, adjusted for within-year clustering among the paired observations, are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 1966-74 1966-68 1969-71 1972-74 1966-74 1966-68 1969-71 1972-74 Full sample Sample means and medians. ***, **, and * indicate the reported value is statistically different from zero at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Industry-adjusted values of q and operating profit computed as above. Acquisitions are defined as creating internal capital markets if financially constrained bidder acquires financially unconstrained target, or financially unconstrained bidder acquires financially constrained target.
